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I analyze how boards of directors with heterogeneous preferences can affect the
information shared with the CEO with the help of a cheap-talk model that allows for
large groups of receivers. This paper provides new insights on how heterogeneity of
boards can change the way of communication between the board and the CEO, related
to different ways of decision making. My model gives some insights how heteroge-
neous preferences can have an impact on how communication between CEO and the
board of directors takes place. I also indicate how coalition forming in the boardroom
can be influenced by director’s and CEO’s perferences. Finnaly this model gives a
possible answer why board of directors hetreogeneity differs even for shareholder
representatives if there are any empoyees on the board.
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1 Introduction
The composition of boards and their effect on firm performance is a widely studied field (for a
survey see Adams et al., 2010). Composition and effects can both be observed and studied from
outside the firm. However, the link between board composition and board effect remains a black
box of what happens inside the board room. How composition influences performance can only
be observed from inside the board room. This article attempts to shed some light into this black
box. I propose that the decisive link between board composition and board performance lies in the
directors’ preferences and how coalitions are formed in the boardroom.
In this paper I analyze non-routine project selection processes of the board as a communication
game between the CEO and a heterogenous board. The most closely related paper to mine is the
theory of friendly boards by Adams and Farreira (2007). They show for a board with a dual role
(monitoring and advising role) that more information is shared if the board is not monitoring to
extensivley. My model is based on the information transmission subgame of their model (Crawford
and Sobel, 1982). I do not consider the other parts of the Adams and Farreira (2007) model.
Keeping all other things equal this extension could be transferred back into their model. My
extension is methodologically related to Goltsman and Pavlov (2011), who introduced a cheap-
talk model with two receivers.
For a more fruitful analyzation of the information transmission process I introduce an audience
with more than two receivers. When we consider larger audiences it gives rise to new questions
on how to solve the decision process within the receiver’s group. In the paper of Goltsman and
Pavlov (2011) this problem does not arise in the same way as in this paper, since in their model both
receivers choose their action independently. However, this assumption is not suitable for audiences
in which some kind of collective decision is made. I first consider a collective decision rule in the
board room which is still closely related to the case described by Goltsman and Pavlov (2011). In
my extension I consider more complex decision rules. Allowing for coalition forming and vote
weighting by power indices has a crucial impact on how informative communication1 takes place.
For the main praxis-oriented contribution of this paper I extend the findings to supervisory boards
and codetermination. However, my model can be adapted to many other governance systems as
my investigation of employee representatives can be transferred to any other group inside a board.
Section 3 concludes.
1 I use the expression informative communication as it is common in cheap-talk literature. This means communication
can be totally uninformative if the sender and the receiver are too biased in their preferences. In this case only a
babbeling equilibrium exists where the receiver will take the action she would take if no communication happens at
all based on her expectations of the sender’s preferences.
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2 The Model
My model builds upon three basic ideas. First, the key role of boards is to monitor the CEO,
but boards have to advise the CEO in non-routine situations. Second, boards are speaking with
one voice according to prior agreement. The last two ideas are adapted from Adams and Farreira
(2007). Third better informed boards are more effective in both advising and monitoring, and
forth, bords totally depend on the CEO for firm-specific information.
Following the basic assumptions I change the setup of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Using the
common cheap-talk game terminology I call the principal receiver and the agent sender. For the
model I assume a finite number of players, one sender and multiple receivers, where the CEO is
the sender and the board members are the receivers. The CEO observes a value a ∈ A = [0, 1],
where A is a set of possible projects to invest in and a is in the current state of the world the most
preferred project, while the board does not observe a. Then the board chooses the size of the
project, s.
As in Adams and Farreira (2007) I assume the utility functions to be quadratic loss functions.
Henceforth the utility function of the CEO is
UCeo = −(g(s)− a)
2. (1)
And the utility function for a board member i is
UBi = −(g(si)− a− bi)
2 (2)
with an individual bias bi ∈ R where i ∈ I is an integer greater than zero and I is a given finite
board size. The decision of the board, g(s), is a function represented by the single votes of the
board members, g(si), built on some decision rule, g. In the basic model I assume g(si) = si.
Or in other words I exclude strategic voting and every board member votes on their preferred
project. Given these utility functions, the CEO’s most preferred project in a is g(s) = a and board
member’s i most preferred project is si = a+ bi. The utility for a given project a for the CEO and
all board members decreases in the distance between a and g(s), or si, respectively. The bias bi
measures the similarity of the CEO’s and of an individual board members’ preferences. For higher
values of bi, a board member prefers to invest more, while a board member with a lower value of
bi prefers lower investments. For bi closer to zero preferences are more aligned. Note that these
quadratic loss functions show a reverse bias compared to most cheap-talk games, since in most
cases the bias is assumed on the sender’s side. However, this does not change the relationship in
any qualitative way. I assume for the bias bi ∈ R. Hence, the unbiased target function, here the
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sender’s utility function, could be rewritten as a biased function by simply holding the receiver’s
bias constant. Mathematically b is the x-coordinate and a change in bias is just a horizontal shift of
the quadratic utility functions. To emphasize this we subtract the bias in the utility function instead
to add it as it is common in most cheap-talk games. In this way this model allows for multiple
receivers and is still comparable to other cheap-talk games. A different interpretation of this model
could be to consider multiple sender-receiver games between every single board member and the
CEO. By doing this the bias can be rewritten on the CEO’s side for every bi. Since we assume
a corporate decision on the receiver’s side, it is easy to see that this would be an unnecessary
complication for our purpose and changing the bias to the receiver’s side would lead to the same
outcome.
I define an equilibrium of a given game between the CEO and the board analogous to Goltsman
and Pavlov (2011) as an equilibrium outcome function s : A → ∆(Rn) if, in this equilibrium, the
probability distribution over the project selection of the board for the possible project a is given by
the vector s(a) ∈ ∆(Rn). Assuming we have an interval partional form as in Crawford and Sobel
(1982), we can establish Bayesian-Nash euqilibria in the following proposition.
Theorem 1. Any equilibrium of the cheap talk game is characterized by a sequence of cutoff types
0 = a0 < a1 . . . < aN = 1 such that the equilibrium outcome s(a) is a constant action pair on
every interval (aK , ak+1) for i ∈ I .
This proposition equals proposition 2 (i) in Goltsman and Pavlov (2011). For the model I only
consider public communication. This simplification does not change this model’s outcomes in any
fundamental way. As I assumed the project selection depends on a corporate decision of the board.
Only the outcome of the decision is payoff-relevant for the CEO, not the single votes. Furthermore
it is not feasible to exclude public communication in this environment.2 The CEO has to inform
the whole board3, which would make distinguished communication difficult to conceal.
2.1 Compromise Solution
Before we can determine which project the board will choose we need to specify which decisions
of the board are reasonable. At first consider voting power symmetry among all board members. I
further assume a compromise is normally agreed. These strong simplifications allow us to assess
some interesting outcomes of this model. If the CEO faces a group of heterogeneous directors who
only differ in their individual preferences bi, the CEO behaves as if she is facing a single board
2 Contrary to private communication the sender cannot communicatate with the receivers separately. In public com-
munication only communication with all receivers at the same time takes place.
3 For example the German Corporate Governance Code (section 3.4.) states for the CEO an obligation to report to the
supervisory board.
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Note that this assumption is closley related to the median voter theorem.
Theorem 2. There is an euqilibrium of the cheap talk game characerized by cutoff types 0 =
a0 < a1 . . . < aN = 1 if and only if the cheap talk game between the sender with utility funtion
UC = −(g(s) − a)







equlibrium with the same cutoff types as in proposition 1.
This proposition 2 represents a generalization of proposition 2 (ii) in Goltsman and Pavlov





In this case, the preferences of CEO and a representative board member are perfectly aligned and
all information is revealed. Unlike in a two player game preferences can be perfectly aligned for
all bi 6= 0 if there are sufficient negative as well as positive biases. This characteristic is called
mutual discipline (Farrell and Gibbons, 1989). The presence of one receiver disciplines the other
receivers and vice versa. In other words it is possible to induce the CEO to reveal all information
even if her preferences are not perfectly aligned with any single member of the board. Although
this is a very special case and not likely to happen, it helps us to consider when more information
will be shared between the board and CEO. As Spector (2000) showed, information is almost
perfectly shared if preferences differ very little.
For a non-extremist CEO and if we assume a distribution with a skewness close to zero, we
can see that for larger boards (higher I) the average bias |b| is decreasing. This leads us to my
first non-intuitive result. The possibility of more information sharing is rising in larger boards.
However, this does not hold for highly skewed distributions. If the distribution of biases has a
positive or a negative skew, the average bias could be too low or too high to allow any informative
communication at all. If the skewness is not too large, another phenomenon described by Farrell
and Gibbons (1989) can arise , the so called one-sided discipline. Intuitively, there is a threshold
b∗ ∈ R+ for the average bias |b| such that there exists an equilibrium if and only if |b| ≤ b
∗. In
this case informative communication is possible even if there are some board members whose bias
is higher than the threshold, |bi| > b
∗, if there are sufficient board members whose bias is lower
then the threshold, |bi| < b
∗. The presence of sufficiently board members with closly aligned
preferences disciplines the higher biased board members. In other words, if there is a majority of
board members who differ very little in their and the CEO’s preferences a compromise is agreed
on even if there are some higher biased board members.
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2.2 Coalition forming
Consider now a decision process on the board where a majority decides on which project to invest
in. If for example the required threshold is fifty percent, a coalition with more than fifty percent
of the votes would dominate all other coalitions. Hence, the resulting voting power of such a
coalition is higher than their share of votes. A widley noticed discussion of such unproportional
voting powers is the work of Banzhaf (1965). His power index is a measure where the voting
power of a group is proportional to the square of their total votes.
The Banzhaf-Index4 relates to which member of a winning coalition can cause a swing. A
member of a coalition can cause a swing if his withdrawl from that coalition would turn the
winning coalition into a losing coalition. Winning coalitions are coalitions whose sum of votes
is at least the required threshold for a collective decision, while all other coalitions are losing
coalitons.
Using the Banzhaf-Index (Banzhaf , 1965) to study a board’s decision, the required threshold is
more than half of the total votes in most cases. A winning coalition will need at least half of the






Here C stands for coalition, in this case the winning coalition. Note that there can be, and most
likely will be, multiple equilibria which statisfy this condition. It is intuitive to assume a coalition
is more likely to be formed if the biases of all coalition members are closer aligned, but |bC |
could be so high such that no information between the CEO and board is shared. In this case, the
only equilibirum is a completly uninformative equilibirum such that the winning coalition would
decide based on their own beliefs regardless of any information sent by the CEO. As we saw
before, informative communication is increasing in larger boards. If a coalition decides to exclude
some board members, it follows that informative communication will be decreasing.
However, there could be a coalition where even more communication takes place than in the
grand coalition. Given a uniform distribution of preferences the case of a more communicative
coalition is not more likely to happen than any other possible coalition. The phenomenon of
mutual discipline would therefore be less likely in coalition building boards. If the skewness of a
distribution is a result of a few extreme biased board members, we can assume these extremists to
be higher biased to the average bias of any winning coalition. This leads us to the next proposition
of this paper.
Theorem 3. For two possible winning coalitions with the same power index the coalition with the
lower average bias will be prefered by most coalition members.
4 The Banzhaf-Index is calculated as follows: Bk =
Ck
2n−1
where Ck is the number of coalitions where one coalition
member can cause a swing.
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Proof. Assume a winning coalition to be in the interval bL ≤ bC ≤ bU within the lower boundary
bL and the upper boundary bU . If there are two possible winning coalitions with the same power
index with C0 = [bL, bU ] and C1 = [bL+1, bU+1] such that |bL| ≤ |bL+1| and |bU | < |bU+1| then
coalition C0 would have a lower average bias. It follows C1 ≺ C0 for all coaliton members in C0
since coalition C0 offers the closer aligned preferences.
For extremistic biased board members, proposition 3 results in a more likely exclusion from
decision making. Most coalition members will exclude any extremistic board member if there is a
less biased board member who can have the same impact as the extremist. Both coalitions (C0, C1)
can be an equilibrium. But one (C0) offers a higher value to all coaliton members, hence this is
preferred. Overall, in coalition building environments, one-sided discipline still holds for skewed
bias distributions where one-sided discipline would otherwise fail without coalition forming.
2.3 Supervisory Boards and Codetermination
In this section I will further extend this model to include an application of supervisory boards
with codetermination, with a focus on the German governance system. German public held com-
panies (Aktiengesellschaft or AG) have a dual board structure. The executive management board
(Vorstand) is responsible for firm operations, while the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) has a role
that is similar to the Anglo-American boards of directors. Their responsibilities include long-term
decisions, selection of a CEO, and evaluation of the executive’s performance (Prigge , 1998).
Following our discussion of power indices we could assume that the shareholders and the em-
ployee representatives are two different coalitions. The outcome of such a situation is easy to
estimate if we assume a strong social cohesion (at least) for the shareholders’ representatives.
Since the shareholders’ representatives always have more seats or are favored by decision rules
(second vote rule5), their normalized Banzhaf-Index would always be 1 and the employee rep-
resentatives’ index would be 0. In this case the relevant bias for the CEO would be the average





bi. Hence, this solution is only efficient if the share-
holders can choose a CEO whose bias is closely aligned with the shareholder representatives’ bias
in the supervisory board. Which is a very strict assumption. As Jensen (1986) showed: “Managers
have incentives to cause their firms to grow beyond the optimal size”. For such an empire build-
ing CEO who prefers to overinvest, the assumption of closely aligned preferences will very likely
fail. At least the probability of more informative communication will be lower for boards, with
shareholders totally dominating employee representatives, since the shareholders’ perferences are
not closely aligned with the CEO.
5 The chairman of the supervisory board, usually a shareholder representative, has a second vote to solve a possible
standoff.
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If we assume some skewed distribution for the shareholder representatives’ individual biases,
we cannot simply conclude that the majority of board members or the second vote rule always
outvotes the employee representatives on the board. Following proposition 3 it is possible to think
of situations where the bias of one or more shareholder representatives are closely enough aligned
with the employee representatives and the CEO to allow some coalition forming. This is a pos-
sible explanation as to why there could be situations where CEO and employees would collude
against most shareholders. In their empirical study, Gorton and Schmid (2004) hypothesize code-
termination would change the target function of a firm. They observe lower shareholder value and
higher employment for German codetermined firms. Following this model, this could be an indi-
cation for at least some individual biases of shareholder representatives beeing closer aligned with
employee preferences. Informed shareholders can anticipate that such an appointment of their
representatives to the board would not lead to the desired outcome. Hence, shareholders would
appoint representatives whose preferences are known to be less aligned with employees.
3 Conclusion
The black box of the board room seems to be less black after investigating the information trans-
mission process between CEO and board. These models gives some insights how heterogeneous
preferences can have an impact on how communication between CEO and the board of directors
takes place. This paper offers a few relevant policy implications for corporate governance struc-
tures. The first implication of my model is that informative communication between CEO and
board rises with the size of heterogenous boards. The reason behind this is that different prefer-
ences can discipline other board members, and a more effective compromise can be agreed on.
An other model outcome indicates how coalition forming in the boardroom can be influenced by
director’s and CEO’s perferences. This could be an interesting topic for empirical studies to ask
why some coalitions are more frequently than others and how this is related to firm performance.
Finnaly this model gives a possible answer why board of directors hetreogeneity differs even for
shareholder representatives if there are any empoyees on the board.
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